Saturday, May 13, 2006
Viktor Bout: What's Up in the Yemen?
Thursday, January 20, 2005
Viktor Bout: What's Up in the Yemen?
If you check the Sharjah Airport arrival and departure lists, here, you'll see a variety of interesting things. For a start, there's the regular BGIA service to Baghdad as previously blogged. There are other dubious names like Airline Transport, Air West and TransAvia Export. But what is the explanation of the 3 or sometimes 4 flights listed as leaving for Riyan Mukalla, Yemen, every night at 0001 and 0010 hours? They are listed as operated by Irbis, a well-known Bout operation registered in Kazakhstan that has sometimes been described as a charter broker marketing the rest of the system's services.
Riyan lies on the coast of Yemen, in the Hadrahmaut region at Lat.14° 39' 45.50" N, Long.49° 22' 30.10" E. The nearest town (about six miles away) is Al-Mukalla. The ICAO code is OYRN. Satellite mapping shows a major airfield with a single 10,000ft plus runway (that's nearly as long as London Heathrow, for comparison). More details are available here. All that concrete would appear to be a legacy of the British empire - Riyan was one of the numerous post-war RAF stations in the Arabian peninsula, both as a base for the various small wars and as a staging post on the route to the Far East. Much later, during the early 1990s, the airport was a source of supply for the Democratic Republic of Yemen side. Interestingly enough, Chris Barrett-Jolley's Phoenix Aviation was involved in these arms deliveries. An ITV documentary team who interviewed participants including CBJ was told (See below)that they saw USAF AWACS aircraft operating over the Red Sea enroute there on at least two occasions and that Saudi agents were in evidence at Riyan. References in the text of that report show that these claims were made by CBJ personally.
This particular job shows every sign of being a VB operation. The armaments were acquired in Bulgaria, probably from the KINTEX state arsenal, and shipped by Peak Aviation on charter from Phoenix (Bulgaria), but later by Phoenix (UK). The flight plan filed in Plovdiv was for N'Djamena (presumably in accordance with the end user certificates), but was changed enroute to Muscat. Even this was false, and the aircraft then diverted to Riyan.
Well, that war is over. It may be of interest that the French supertanker Limburg was attacked by al-Qa'ida very close to Mukalla in 2002, or it may not. But it is certainly interesting that three Irbis flights a night go there, especially as two of them are always scheduled to leave at exactly the same time.
Original:http://yorkshire-ranter.blogspot.com/2005/01/viktor-bout-whats-up-in-yemen.html
____________________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 5
Flying the Company ‘Flags of Convenience’
Beneath a cargo plane’s external paintwork and its simple registration number lie the intricacies of the international aviation business. Especially in poorer countries, the limited capacity of national aviation authorities to monitor and regulate the increasingly complex business makes it easy for weapons trafficking networks to operate.
According to the US International Air Cargo Association, the international rules governing cargo planes are archaic and inconsistent.1 Airfreight businesses want faster procedures and simpler regulations, but many countries lack the resources for stringent airport monitoring of dangerous cargoes. Electronic tagging systems akin to those for international passenger baggage would be fast – but costly. Currently, airfreight documents such as air waybills and cargo manifests do not require detailed descriptions or cross-referencing of the goods described in arms export and import licences. The routes, names of sub-contractors, the ultimate supplier and customer do not need to be specified. Arms have been found described as ‘agricultural equipment’, ‘mining equipment’, ‘spare parts’, ‘fish’, ‘tents’, and ‘second-hand clothing’, so it is easy to see how the absence of comprehensive records makes it exceedingly difficult for law enforcers to quickly identify all those who may be involved.
It is not only cargo that needs international monitoring. An aircraft registration number and the name of the airline leasing or operating the plane can be switched so as to conceal an operation. A cargo aircraft might typically be registered in one country, then leased and chartered by companies registered in another, while their crews can be hired in yet other countries. In addition, the plane might be serviced and based for practical purposes somewhere else, with the main operating offices of the airline or the handling agency based in yet another country or countries. The sub-leasing of international overflight permissions means that one air carrier can use another carrier’s call sign, and this has been used to obfuscate arms deliveries.
The more complex the arrangements, and the less capacity there is to monitor them, the simpler it is for operators, agents and sub-contractors to find ways of denying their involvement in illicit trafficking. A national authority that registers an aircraft to fly under its flag may fail to ensure the airworthiness and safety of that plane. Airlines, planes and aircrew may not all be required to register, and foreign operator permits may carry minimal responsibilities. Even where several aviation authorities try to carry out routine checks on an aircraft’s filed flight plan, they will usually not have
legal powers to act decisively against all serious abuse. This in turn serves to discourage such checking.
Conversations with pilots, loadmasters and aviation inspectors show how easy it is to evade existing controls in countries that lack regulatory resources. A cargo plane was named as flying in at an airport with one registration number and then flying out with a different one. Another airline was said to have changed its corporate structure and name overnight when its name became linked to illicit activities. One operator used an old licence that had been cancelled by aviation authorities to fly several ‘ghost planes’ to hot spots in Africa. Another corporate owner used the logo and colours of a licensed company to fly non-licensed planes. Yet another abusive practice reported was when a cargo plane using a certain flight schedule arrived very late at its stated destination: the plane had in fact made an illegal landing on the way to its destination, unloading illicit cargo without reporting it. More often, non-scheduled landings are used to load illicit cargo en route, and then ship the additional load under cover of the legal cargo.
Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, lacks sufficient skilled air traffic controllers, radar equipment and trained personnel to monitor the vast air space between the southern border of Egypt and the northern borders of South Africa.2 Smaller freight operators often use older aircraft that can evade long-range radar. Moreover, the communications systems of ex-Soviet aircraft are not always compatible with those of other aircraft, making it necessary for pilots to be able to guide themselves. 3 Thus, pilots with military training are in demand. Sub-Saharan air traffic control has been highly
dependent on the selective intelligence and satellite capacity of the former colonial and major world powers, and on the alertness of thinly-spread airport inspectors and
customs agents.4 In such an environment, arms smuggling thrives.
http://www.nisat.org/publications/armsfixers/Chapter5.html
Viktor Bout: What's Up in the Yemen?
If you check the Sharjah Airport arrival and departure lists, here, you'll see a variety of interesting things. For a start, there's the regular BGIA service to Baghdad as previously blogged. There are other dubious names like Airline Transport, Air West and TransAvia Export. But what is the explanation of the 3 or sometimes 4 flights listed as leaving for Riyan Mukalla, Yemen, every night at 0001 and 0010 hours? They are listed as operated by Irbis, a well-known Bout operation registered in Kazakhstan that has sometimes been described as a charter broker marketing the rest of the system's services.
Riyan lies on the coast of Yemen, in the Hadrahmaut region at Lat.14° 39' 45.50" N, Long.49° 22' 30.10" E. The nearest town (about six miles away) is Al-Mukalla. The ICAO code is OYRN. Satellite mapping shows a major airfield with a single 10,000ft plus runway (that's nearly as long as London Heathrow, for comparison). More details are available here. All that concrete would appear to be a legacy of the British empire - Riyan was one of the numerous post-war RAF stations in the Arabian peninsula, both as a base for the various small wars and as a staging post on the route to the Far East. Much later, during the early 1990s, the airport was a source of supply for the Democratic Republic of Yemen side. Interestingly enough, Chris Barrett-Jolley's Phoenix Aviation was involved in these arms deliveries. An ITV documentary team who interviewed participants including CBJ was told (See below)that they saw USAF AWACS aircraft operating over the Red Sea enroute there on at least two occasions and that Saudi agents were in evidence at Riyan. References in the text of that report show that these claims were made by CBJ personally.
This particular job shows every sign of being a VB operation. The armaments were acquired in Bulgaria, probably from the KINTEX state arsenal, and shipped by Peak Aviation on charter from Phoenix (Bulgaria), but later by Phoenix (UK). The flight plan filed in Plovdiv was for N'Djamena (presumably in accordance with the end user certificates), but was changed enroute to Muscat. Even this was false, and the aircraft then diverted to Riyan.
Well, that war is over. It may be of interest that the French supertanker Limburg was attacked by al-Qa'ida very close to Mukalla in 2002, or it may not. But it is certainly interesting that three Irbis flights a night go there, especially as two of them are always scheduled to leave at exactly the same time.
Original:http://yorkshire-ranter.blogspot.com/2005/01/viktor-bout-whats-up-in-yemen.html
____________________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 5
Flying the Company ‘Flags of Convenience’
Beneath a cargo plane’s external paintwork and its simple registration number lie the intricacies of the international aviation business. Especially in poorer countries, the limited capacity of national aviation authorities to monitor and regulate the increasingly complex business makes it easy for weapons trafficking networks to operate.
According to the US International Air Cargo Association, the international rules governing cargo planes are archaic and inconsistent.1 Airfreight businesses want faster procedures and simpler regulations, but many countries lack the resources for stringent airport monitoring of dangerous cargoes. Electronic tagging systems akin to those for international passenger baggage would be fast – but costly. Currently, airfreight documents such as air waybills and cargo manifests do not require detailed descriptions or cross-referencing of the goods described in arms export and import licences. The routes, names of sub-contractors, the ultimate supplier and customer do not need to be specified. Arms have been found described as ‘agricultural equipment’, ‘mining equipment’, ‘spare parts’, ‘fish’, ‘tents’, and ‘second-hand clothing’, so it is easy to see how the absence of comprehensive records makes it exceedingly difficult for law enforcers to quickly identify all those who may be involved.
It is not only cargo that needs international monitoring. An aircraft registration number and the name of the airline leasing or operating the plane can be switched so as to conceal an operation. A cargo aircraft might typically be registered in one country, then leased and chartered by companies registered in another, while their crews can be hired in yet other countries. In addition, the plane might be serviced and based for practical purposes somewhere else, with the main operating offices of the airline or the handling agency based in yet another country or countries. The sub-leasing of international overflight permissions means that one air carrier can use another carrier’s call sign, and this has been used to obfuscate arms deliveries.
The more complex the arrangements, and the less capacity there is to monitor them, the simpler it is for operators, agents and sub-contractors to find ways of denying their involvement in illicit trafficking. A national authority that registers an aircraft to fly under its flag may fail to ensure the airworthiness and safety of that plane. Airlines, planes and aircrew may not all be required to register, and foreign operator permits may carry minimal responsibilities. Even where several aviation authorities try to carry out routine checks on an aircraft’s filed flight plan, they will usually not have
legal powers to act decisively against all serious abuse. This in turn serves to discourage such checking.
Conversations with pilots, loadmasters and aviation inspectors show how easy it is to evade existing controls in countries that lack regulatory resources. A cargo plane was named as flying in at an airport with one registration number and then flying out with a different one. Another airline was said to have changed its corporate structure and name overnight when its name became linked to illicit activities. One operator used an old licence that had been cancelled by aviation authorities to fly several ‘ghost planes’ to hot spots in Africa. Another corporate owner used the logo and colours of a licensed company to fly non-licensed planes. Yet another abusive practice reported was when a cargo plane using a certain flight schedule arrived very late at its stated destination: the plane had in fact made an illegal landing on the way to its destination, unloading illicit cargo without reporting it. More often, non-scheduled landings are used to load illicit cargo en route, and then ship the additional load under cover of the legal cargo.
Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, lacks sufficient skilled air traffic controllers, radar equipment and trained personnel to monitor the vast air space between the southern border of Egypt and the northern borders of South Africa.2 Smaller freight operators often use older aircraft that can evade long-range radar. Moreover, the communications systems of ex-Soviet aircraft are not always compatible with those of other aircraft, making it necessary for pilots to be able to guide themselves. 3 Thus, pilots with military training are in demand. Sub-Saharan air traffic control has been highly
dependent on the selective intelligence and satellite capacity of the former colonial and major world powers, and on the alertness of thinly-spread airport inspectors and
customs agents.4 In such an environment, arms smuggling thrives.
http://www.nisat.org/publications/armsfixers/Chapter5.html
# posted by Always @ 5:32 AM 
